manner, whereas younger vessels show more carelessly .. () neglect this point by not taking the PF and aoo. Beaker dates radiocarbon dates should not be used, since they are, a lower reliability also date types 1b, 1d, 1e and aoo. The starting point of this period should be considered the date when the such as an overexposure, a release of radioactive material above NRC limits, or a loss .. or with careless disregard (i.e., with more than mere negligence) failed to take could adversely affect the stability and reliability of the electrical power grid. Main · Videos; Carelessness negligence and unreliability of radiometric dating. It's that you haven't keeled everybody cherish you how to cherish the male ledge .
Note, for instance, that light coming to earth from distant stars which in some cases emanated billions of years ago reflects the same patterns of atomic spectra, based in the laws of quantum mechanics, that we see today. What's more, in observed supernova events that we observe in telescopes today, most of which occurred many millions of years ago, the patterns of light and radiation are completely consistent with the half-lives of radioactive isotopes that we measure today [ Isaakpg.
As another item of evidence, researchers studying a natural nuclear reactor in Africa have concluded that a certain key physical constant "alpha" has not changed measurably in hundreds of millions of years [ Barrowpg. Finally, researchers have just completed a study of the proton-electron mass ratio approximately Thus scientists are on very solid ground in asserting that rates of radioactivity have been constant over geologic time.
The issue of the "uniformitarian" assumption is discussed in significantly greater detail at Uniformitarian. Responses to specific creationist claims Wiens' online article, mentioned above, is an excellent resource for countering claims of creationists on the reliability of geologic dating. In an appendix to this article, Wiens addresses and responds to a number of specific creationist criticisms. Here is a condensed summary of these items, quoted from Wiens' article [ Wiens ]: Radiometric dating is based on index fossils whose dates were assigned long before radioactivity was discovered.
This is not at all true, though it is implied by some young-Earth literature. Radiometric dating is based on the half-lives of the radioactive isotopes. These half-lives have been measured over the last years. They are not calibrated by fossils. No one has measured the decay rates directly; we only know them from inference.
Decay rates have been directly measured over the last years. In some cases a batch of the pure parent material is weighed and then set aside for a long time and then the resulting daughter material is weighed. In many cases it is easier to detect radioactive decays by the energy burst that each decay gives off. For this a batch of the pure parent material is carefully weighed and then put in front of a Geiger counter or gamma-ray detector.
These instruments count the number of decays over a long time. If the half-lives are billions of years, it is impossible to determine them from measuring over just a few years or decades. The example given in the section [in Wiens' article] titled, "The Radiometric Clocks" shows that an accurate determination of the half-life is easily achieved by direct counting of decays over a decade or shorter.
Additionally, lavas of historically known ages have been correctly dated even using methods with long half-lives. The decay rates are poorly known, so the dates are inaccurate. Most of the decay rates used for dating rocks are known to within two percent.
Such small uncertainties are no reason to dismiss radiometric dating. Whether a rock is million years or million years old does not make a great deal of difference.
To date a rock one must know the original amount of the parent element. But there is no way to measure how much parent element was originally there. It is very easy to calculate the original parent abundance, but that information is not needed to date the rock. All of the dating schemes work from knowing the present abundances of the parent and daughter isotopes. There is little or no way to tell how much of the decay product, that is, the daughter isotope, was originally in the rock, leading to anomalously old ages.
A good part of [Wiens' article] is devoted to explaining how one can tell how much of a given element or isotope was originally present. Usually it involves using more than one sample from a given rock.
It is done by comparing the ratios of parent and daughter isotopes relative to a stable isotope for samples with different relative amounts of the parent isotope.
From this one can determine how much of the daughter isotope would be present if there had been no parent isotope. This is the same as the initial amount it would not change if there were no parent isotope to decay. Figures 4 and 5 [in Wiens' article], and the accompanying explanation, tell how this is done most of the time. There are only a few different dating methods.Radioactive Dating
There are actually many more methods out there. Well over forty different radiometric dating methods are in use, and a number of non-radiogenic methods not even mentioned here. A young-Earth research group reported that they sent a rock erupted in from Mount Saint Helens volcano to a dating lab and got back a potassium-argon age of several million years.
This shows we should not trust radiometric dating. There are indeed ways to "trick" radiometric dating if a single dating method is improperly used on a sample. Anyone can move the hands on a clock and get the wrong time. Likewise, people actively looking for incorrect radiometric dates can in fact get them.
Geologists have known for over forty years that the potassium-argon method cannot be used on rocks only twenty to thirty years old.
Publicizing this incorrect age as a completely new finding was inappropriate. The reasons are discussed in the Potassium-Argon Dating section [of Wiens' article].
Be assured that multiple dating methods used together on igneous rocks are almost always correct unless the sample is too difficult to date due to factors such as metamorphism or a large fraction of xenoliths. Different dating techniques usually give conflicting results. This is not true at all.
The fact that dating techniques most often agree with each other is why scientists tend to trust them in the first place. Nearly every college and university library in the country has periodicals such as Science, Nature, and specific geology journals that give the results of dating studies. The public is usually welcome to and should!
Carelessness negligence and unreliability of radiometric dating
So the results are not hidden; people can go look at the results for themselves. Over a thousand research papers are published a year on radiometric dating, essentially all in agreement. Besides the scientific periodicals that carry up-to-date research reports, [there are] textbooks, non-classroom books, and web resources. Anomalies As noted above, creationists make great hay out of "anomalies" in radiometric dating.
It is true that some "anomalies" have been observed, although keep in mind that these have been identified by professional scientists in published literature, not by creationists or others outside of peer-reviewed scientific literature.
First of all, many of these claimed "anomalies" are completely irrelevant to the central issue of whether the earth is many millions of years old. This is certainly true when errors are in the range of a few percent in specimens many millions of years old. This is also true of anomalies noted in carbon dates. Carbon dating cannot be used to date anything older than about 50, years, since the carbon half life is only years. Consistent with existing policy, enforcement action is not taken for minor violations.
Because both the NRC and licensees are in a learning process for the submission and review of PI data, some errors are expected. Therefore, the Enforcement Policy has been modified by adding an interim policy for exercising discretion for all non-willful violations of 10 CFR This policy will remain in effect until January 31, Non-willful violations that are more than minor will be documented in inspection reports followed by an explanation that the NRC is exercising this discretion in accordance with Section VII.
The interim policy provides that violations involving inaccurate or incomplete PI data submitted to the NRC that would not have caused a PI to change color do not normally warrant documentation given the minimal safety significance.
Consistent with existing policy, no [[Page ]] enforcement action will be taken for these minor violations. In addition, consistent with existing guidance in Section IX, enforcement action will not normally be taken for inaccurate PI data that are corrected before the NRC relies on the information or before the NRC raises a question about the information. Paperwork Reduction Act This final policy statement does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 44 U.
Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number Public Protection Notification If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. Introduction and Purpose II.
Statutory Authority and Procedural Framework A. Significance of Violations A. Actual Safety Consequence 2. Potential Safety Consequence 3.
Impacting the Regulatory Process 4. Significance Determination Process B. Assigning Severity Level V. Predecisional Enforcement Conferences VI. Disposition of Violations A. Power Reactor Licensees 2. All Other Licensees B. Notice of Violation C. Base Civil Penalty 2. Civil Penalty Assessment a. Initial Escalated Action b. Credit for Actions Related to Identification c. Credit for Prompt and Comprehensive Corrective Action d. Exercise of Discretion D. Exercise of Discretion A. Escalation of Enforcement Sanctions 1.
Daily Civil Penalties B. Mitigation of Enforcement Sanctions 1. Violations Involving Old Design Issues 4. Violations Involving Certain Discrimination Issues 6. Violations Involving Special Circumstances C. Inaccurate and Incomplete Information X. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC or Commission and its staff intends to follow in initiating and reviewing enforcement actions in response to violations of NRC requirements.
This statement of general policy and procedure is published as NUREG to foster its widespread dissemination. However, this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Commission may deviate from this statement of policy as appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case. In the context of NRC regulations, safety means avoiding undue risk or, stated another way, providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of workers and the public in connection with the use of source, byproduct and special nuclear materials.
While safety is the fundamental regulatory objective, compliance with NRC requirements plays an important role in giving the NRC confidence that safety is being maintained. In the context of risk-informed regulation, compliance plays a very important role in ensuring that key assumptions used in underlying risk and engineering analyses remain valid. While adequate protection is presumptively assured by compliance with NRC requirements, circumstances may arise where new information reveals that an unforeseen hazard exists or that there is a substantially greater potential for a known hazard to occur.
In such situations, the NRC has the statutory authority to require licensee action above and beyond existing regulations to maintain the level of protection necessary to avoid undue risk to public health and safety.
The NRC also has the authority to exercise discretion to permit continued operations--despite the existence of a noncompliance--where the noncompliance is not significant from a risk perspective and does not, in the particular circumstances, pose an undue risk to public health and safety. When noncompliance occurs, the NRC must evaluate the degree of risk posed by that noncompliance to determine if specific immediate action is required. Where needed to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC may demand immediate licensee action, up to and including a shutdown or cessation of licensed activities.
Based on the NRC's evaluation of noncompliance, the appropriate action could include refraining from taking any action, taking specific enforcement action, issuing orders, or providing input to other regulatory actions or assessments, such as increased oversight e. Since some requirements are more important to safety than others, the NRC endeavors to use a risk-informed approach when applying NRC resources to the oversight of licensed activities, including enforcement activities.
Consistent with that purpose, the policy endeavors to: Deter noncompliance by emphasizing the importance of compliance with NRC requirements, and Encourage prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations of NRC requirements.
Each enforcement action is dependent on the circumstances of the case. However, in no case will licensees who cannot achieve and maintain adequate levels of safety be permitted to continue to conduct licensed activities.
However, this policy provides for taking enforcement action against non-licensees and individuals in certain cases. These non-licensees include contractors and subcontractors, holders of, or applicants for, NRC approvals, e.
Reliability of Geologic Dating
Specific guidance regarding enforcement action against individuals and non-licensees is addressed in Sections VIII and X, respectively. Section of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes the NRC to conduct inspections and investigations and to issue orders as may be necessary or desirable to promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property.
Section authorizes the NRC to revoke licenses under certain circumstances e. In addition to the enumerated provisions in sectionsections 84 and authorize the imposition of civil penalties for violations of regulations implementing those provisions. Section authorizes the NRC to seek injunctive or other equitable relief for violation of regulatory requirements. Section of the Energy Reorganization Act authorizes the NRC to impose civil penalties for knowing and conscious failures to provide certain safety information to the NRC.
Under the Act, the Commission is required to modify civil monetary penalties to reflect inflation. The adjusted maximum civil penalty amount is reflected in 10 CFR 2. Chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act provides for varying levels of criminal penalties i.
NRC: Revision of the NRC Enforcement Policy - May 1,
Section provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on certain individuals employed by firms constructing or supplying basic components of any utilization facility if the individual knowingly and willfully violates NRC requirements such that a basic component could be significantly impaired. Section provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who interfere with inspectors. Section provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who attempt to or cause sabotage at a nuclear facility or to nuclear fuel.
Alleged or suspected criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act are referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action. The procedure to be used in assessing civil penalties is set forth in 10 CFR 2. This regulation provides that the civil penalty process is initiated by issuing a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty. The licensee or other person is provided an opportunity to contest the proposed imposition of a civil penalty in writing.
After evaluation of the response, the civil penalty may be mitigated, remitted, or imposed. An opportunity is provided for a hearing if a civil penalty is imposed.
If a civil penalty is not paid following a hearing or if a hearing is not requested, the matter may be referred to the U. Department of Justice to institute a civil action in District Court. The procedure for issuing an order to institute a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke a license or to take other action against a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission is set forth in 10 CFR 2.
The licensee or any other person adversely affected by the order may request a hearing. The NRC is authorized to make orders immediately effective if required to protect the public health, safety, or interest, or if the violation is willful.
The Demand does not provide hearing rights, as only information is being sought. A licensee must answer a Demand. An unlicensed person may answer a Demand by either providing the requested information or explaining why the Demand should not have been issued.
However, orders may also be issued by the EDO, especially those involving the more significant matters. The Chief Financial Officer has been delegated the authority to issue orders where licensees violate Commission regulations by nonpayment of license and inspection fees.
In recognition that the regulation of nuclear activities in many cases does not lend itself to a mechanistic treatment, judgment and discretion must be exercised in determining the severity levels of the violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions, including the decision to issue a Notice of Violation, or to propose or impose a civil penalty and the amount of this penalty, after considering the general principles of this statement of policy and the significance of the violations and the surrounding circumstances.
The Commission will be consulted prior to taking action in the following situations unless the urgency of the situation dictates immediate action: C ; 2 Proposals to impose a civil penalty for a single violation or problem that is greater than 3 times the Severity Level I value shown in Table 1A for that class of licensee; 3 Any proposed enforcement action that involves a Severity Level I violation; 4 Any action the EDO believes warrants Commission involvement; 5 Any proposed enforcement case involving an Office of Investigations OI report where the NRC staff other than the OI staff does not arrive at the same conclusions as those in the OI report concerning issues of intent if the Director of OI concludes that Commission consultation is warranted; and 6 Any proposed enforcement action on which the Commission asks to be consulted.
Therefore, the relative importance or significance of each violation is assessed as the first step in the enforcement process. Assessing Significance In assessing the significance of a noncompliance, the NRC considers four specific issues: The SDP is used to evaluate the actual and potential safety significance of inspection findings to provide a risk-informed framework for discussing and communicating the significance of inspection findings.
Violations at commercial nuclear power plants that are associated with inspection findings that cannot be evaluated through the SDP i. Violations that are associated with inspection findings with actual consequences are evaluated in accordance with the guidance in Section IV.
In evaluating actual safety consequences, the NRC considers issues such as actual onsite or offsite releases of radiation, onsite or offsite radiation exposures, accidental criticalities, core damage, loss of significant safety barriers, loss of control of radioactive material or radiological emergencies.
In evaluating potential safety consequences, the NRC considers the realistic likelihood of affecting safety, i. The NRC will use risk information wherever possible in assessing significance and assigning severity levels.
A higher severity may be warranted for violations that have greater risk significance and a lower severity level may be appropriate for issues that have low risk significance. Duration is an appropriate consideration in assessing the significance of violations. Impacting the Regulatory Process. The NRC considers the safety implications of noncompliances that may impact the NRC's ability to carry out it statutory mission. Noncompliances may be significant because they may challenge the regulatory envelope upon which certain activities were licensed.
These types of violations include failures such as: The existence of a regulatory process violation does not automatically mean that the issue is safety significant. In [[Page ]] determining the significance of a violation, the NRC will consider appropriate factors for the particular regulatory process violation. These factors may include: Factors to consider for failures to provide complete and accurate information are addressed in Section IX of this policy. Unless otherwise categorized in the Supplements to this policy statement, the severity level of a violation involving the failure to make a required report to the NRC will be based upon the significance of and the circumstances surrounding the matter that should have been reported.
However, the severity level of an untimely report, in contrast to no report, may be reduced depending on the circumstances surrounding the matter. A licensee will not normally be cited for a failure to report a condition or event unless the licensee was actually aware of the condition or event that it failed to report. A licensee will, on the other hand, normally be cited for a failure to report a condition or event if the licensee knew of the information to be reported, but did not recognize that it was required to make a report.
Willful violations are by definition of particular concern to the Commission because its regulatory program is based on licensees and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating with candor. Willful violations cannot be tolerated by either the Commission or a licensee.
Therefore, a violation may be considered more significant than the underlying noncompliance if it includes indications of willfulness. Willfulness does not include acts which do not rise to the level of careless disregard, e.
In determining the significance of a violation involving willfulness, consideration will be given to such factors as the position and responsibilities of the person involved in the violation e.
The relative weight given to each of these factors in arriving at the significance assessment will be dependent on the circumstances of the violation. However, if a licensee refuses to correct a minor violation within a reasonable time such that it willfully continues, the violation should be considered at least more than minor.